This article puts the judgment of the EC Court of First Instance (CFI) in Microsoft in perspective and links it with the ongoing discussion on competition policy and innovation. It also replies to some claims made by Ahlborn and Evans in their piece on the same judgment (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115867). The first section takes a general look at the judgment, and in particular at how the CFI issued a judgment from which it would be difficult to appeal. It also addresses the allegedly excessive deference of the CFI towards the Commission decision (1). Afterwards, the paper goes into more specific issues concerning the first part on interoperability information (2) and the second part on tying (3). Finally, the judgment is placed in a broader forward-looking perspective (4).
The judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the European Communities in Microsoft v. Commission 1 led to the closing of this 10-year mammoth case. 2 Its sheer size immediately begs the question of whether there are any conclusions, guidance or lessons transcending this complex story.
This article seeks to answer this question, if only in part. It complements and comments upon the companion piece of Ahlborn and Evans, who address the same question. 3 It shows that, while the broad criticism levelled by Ahlborn and Evans might be unjustified, there are a number of more specific points where the CFI opens more issues than it solves with its judgment, in particular as regards the relationship between competition policy and innovation.
The first section takes a general look at the judgment, and in particular at how the CFI issued a judgment from which it would be difficult to appeal. 4 It also addresses the allegedly excessive deference of the CFI towards the Commission decision (1). Afterwards, the paper goes into more specific issues concerning the first part on interoperability information (2) and the second part on tying (3). Finally, the judgment is placed in a broader forward-looking perspective (4).
The CFI between the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
Institutionally, the CFI finds itself between the Commission and the ECJ. In its judgment it sought to fulfil its review function with respect to the Commission (1.2.) while avoiding exposing itself to criticism from the ECJ on an eventual appeal (1.1.).
The eventual appeal to the ECJ
The CFI judgment in Microsoft appears to be designed to avoid any exposure to a reprimand by the ECJ, by minimizing the chances of appeal. 5 The CFI seems to keep itself busy with facts for the larger part of the opinion, or at least to want the reader to perceive the case as a large mass of factual issues thrust upon a relatively simple and straightforward legal framework. Those parts of the judgment which are explicitly presented as issues of law are apparently devoid of any innovation which could trigger further discussion.
So it is with the first part on the supply of interoperability information. The Commission case hinges upon the line of case-law concerning refusal to supply, starting with Commercial Solvents, 6 and including -or morphing into -the so-called Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD), which although never recognized by name is said to be exemplified by a string of major cases, namely Magill, 7 Bronner 8 and IMS. 9 A key element in the latter cases in particular are those conditions or "exceptional circumstances" 10 under which Article 82 EC could trump property rights -over physical or intellectual property -to support an order forcing the holder of such rights to grant access to competitors. Over the years, the ECJ seemed to converge towards a specific list of conditions. 11 In its decision, the Commission was short on the law and surprisingly audacious, staking its entire case on the claim that "there is no persuasiveness to an approach that would advocate the existence of an exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances and would have the Commission disregard a limine other circumstances of exceptional character that may deserve to be taken into account when assessing a refusal to supply." 12 In its judgment, the CFI carefully avoids the issue, finding that it "follows from... case-law that the following circumstances, in particular, must be considered to be exceptional [emphasis added]". 13 The CFI then proceeds to restate those conditions, in a way which carefully follows existing ECJ case-law. 14 The rest of the judgment on the first issue, for all its length, professes to do nothing more than review whether the Commission made out those circumstances on the facts of Microsoft. The CFI thereby avoids ruling on the Commission argument about the exhaustiveness of the list drawn from ECJ case-law.
On the second part regarding tying, the CFI went further: not only did it put the case against Microsoft on fairly safe legal terrain, but it actually supplied the legal reasoning which was missing from the Commission decision. If the legal reasoning of the Commission under the first part was audacious, it was skimpy at best under the second one. The Commission pulled out its four conditions for tying to be prohibited under Article 82 EC like a rabbit out of a hat, with no references whatsoever to support its 6 10 In their case-law, the ECJ and CFI characterize as "exceptional circumstances" the conditions required to jutisfy ordering a dominant firms to provide access to its physical or intellectual property. For the sake of simplicity in drafting, they are referred to here as "conditions". 11 In IMS, supra, note 9, while the ECJ did specify that the conditions were cumulative, it did not rule that the list was exhaustive. That case was in any event decided after the Commission decision in Microsoft. 12 Decision at para. 555. 13 Judgment at para. 332. 14 Ibid., with the addition of the absence of objective justification at para. 333, the note that the new product condition is found only in intellectual property cases at para. 334 and the two-market construction at para. 335.
assertion. 15 In particular, the Commission did not explain how these conditions related to the two leading cases on tying until then, Hilti 16 and Tetra Pak. 17 The CFI obliged and constructed the legal reasoning which the Commission should have included in its Decision, 18 thereby also positioning the Decision as a mere application of conditions which had already been outlined in -or at least could be derived from -previous cases.
In the end, the CFI judgment is made to appear light on law and heavy on fact. What is more, the legal discussion is short and seems uncontroversial. In the light of the limited scope of appeals to the ECJ (on points of law only), this reduced greatly the basis for an appeal from that judgment (and the chances that it could be successful). Unfortunately, this also means that the more interesting points in the judgment are hidden -sometimes deep -in what appear to be discussions of fact. The CFI judgment does indeed feature a number of remarkable passages, some of which are picked up in the next sections.
The review of the Commission Decision
Ahlborn and Evans argue that the CFI was too deferential to the Commission. They claim that this deferential attitude is typical of Article 82 EC cases, and that it is potentially dangerous in that it leaves the Commission (and NCAs and national courts acting as original instances) with too much discretion in the application of Article 82 EC.
Yet in Microsoft, the CFI extends the "more attentive" approach introduced in Merger Control Regulation (MCR) cases 19 to Article 82 EC cases. The CFI adopts the standard set out by the ECJ in Tetra Laval: "The Community Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it." 20 As a matter of principle, Microsoft actually heralds closer scrutiny of Commission decisions.
Ahlborn and Evans note that the CFI also recalls the general proposition that the Court will only undertake a limited review of complex economic or technical appraisals made by the Commission under competition law. 21 While this may seem to send a "mixed message", as the two authors claim, it is important to keep in mind the nature of the proceedings: the CFI does not conduct an appeal de novo, and accordingly it will not reach its own conclusions on what the "correct" legal assessment was. The CFI is conducting judicial review of a Commission decision in area where the Commission enjoys a measure of discretion, and accordingly the key issue is whether the Commission reached the conclusion it did without manifest errors.
More fundamentally, the degree of deference granted to Commission decisions cannot be measured simply by looking at the success rate of challenges to various types of Commission decisions before the Community courts, as Ahlborn and Evans do. This approach is methodologically flawed for two reasons. Firstly, the dataset is not necessarily representative, comparing as it does cases brought before the ECJ/CFI against MCR or Article 82 decisions. On the one hand, MCR decisions are typically not brought to the CFI unless there is a major concern with the decision. It is well known that despite the efforts of the CFI, firms cannot afford to wait for the outcome of a challenge to a Commission decision. Hence positive decisions with commitments on the part of the notifying parties are rarely challenged by the parties, even if the Commission might have made errors in its assessment. 22 Typically the most controversial negative decisions end up before the CFI. 23 They are left out of the dataset since they do not correspond to the concern for Type I errors which underpins the discussion of deference. If they were included, in any event, the reversal percentage for MCR decisions would only be decreased. 23 And even then only to make the point, as was the case with GE/Honeywell. deferent whenever it fails to quash a Commission decision. However, it is quite possible that the Court, having submitted the Commission decision to thorough scrutiny, would still conclude that the Commission did its work properly and that its decision should stand. In other words, the Court can both leave deference at the door and yet ultimately side with the Commission. 26 If anything, Microsoft marks a new era in Article 82 EC litigation. Never before had the Commission put so much effort and care into a decision, and never before had the CFI looked into every nook and cranny of an Article 82 EC decision the way it did in its judgment. Without wanting to launch a discussion on litigation strategy, the reasons for judgment filed by the CFI show that the Court had to deal with a large number of arguments thrown at it by Microsoft; some were dismissed summarily as "merely semantic" 27 or "purely formal" 28 but the others were considered carefully, as the reasons for judgment show. Save for the management trustee, Microsoft simply failed to convince the CFI that the Commission had made a manifest error in its Decision. But the CFI left no stone unturned.
The CFI judgment might appear deferential in the light of the earlier Order of the President of the CFI on Microsoft's application for interim measures (suspension of the Commission Decision pending review). 29 Indeed that Order had gone against Microsoft, but not for the usual reasons. According to the case-law of the ECJ, interim measures can be granted if the entrant shows (i) a prima facie case on the substance and (ii) urgency, i.e. that the balance of inconvenience weighs in favour of the entrant. 30 Typically, when applications for interim measures are turned down, the order turns on the prima facie case (first condition). The Order in Microsoft was a rare instance where the entrant was found to have made a prima facie case; the application was rejected on urgency. In his Order, the President of the CFI indicated that he thought that Microsoft had valid arguments against the Commission Decision on both the interoperability information 31 and the tying 32 issues. Yet none of these arguments carried the day in the actual judgment three years later. The President might have been outvoted in the Grand Chamber. 33 At the same 26 From a lawyer's perspective, the conflation of the outcome (confirm or quash) with the process (deferential or not) reflects a typical failure of social science research to take judicial processes seriously, focusing instead of outcomes and extraneous factors. 27 36 It is open to argument whether the Commission might not have been wiser to rely on the "classical" refusal to supply case-law, as exemplified by Commercial Solvents, supra, note 6, instead of the more recent "essential facilities" line of cases. For a comparison between the two, see P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Oxford: Hart, 2000) at 203-211. Commercial Solvents involved the disruption of earlier levels of supply and set a much lower threshold for abuse than the "essential facilities" cases where dominant firms were forced to open up access where it had never been granted before. Two reasons might explain why the Commission took the legal position it did in Microsoft: (i) the prevalence within the Commission staff of the unified theory of refusal to supply and essential facilities, according to which the whole case-law is part of a coherent whole (as put forward by J. 
2.1.

Indispensability of the property to which access is sought
As for indispensability, the CFI downplays a key issue, namely the degree of interoperability which a dominant firm is bound to provide to its competitors. That issue is dealt with early in the judgment, almost as a preliminary matter. 38 In its argument before both Commission and CFI, Microsoft relied heavily on the definition of interoperability given at Directive 91/250. 39 Echoing the Commission, the CFI finds no inconsistency between the degree of interoperability required in the Decision and the definition of Directive 91/250, and holds in any event that the Directive was ultimately irrelevant when it came to interpreting Article 82 EC. 40 Yet the arguments focus on the wording of the Directive and fail to address squarely the main point, namely the extent of the special responsibility of a dominant firm.
As a starting point, in the computer network of a typical business, a large number of servers interact with the client computers and with each other in what is termed a "domain architecture". In a nutshell, Microsoft's view was that it was sufficient if rival workgroup server operating systems (OS) were able to interoperate with Windows clients (so-called client/server interoperability). In such a case, Microsoft and its rivals would essentially have competed for the whole of the domain architecture, i.e. for all the servers of a given business (or at least all of its workgroup servers). This could be equated with "competition for the market" of each individual business customer, 41 a fairly granular form of competition.
In contrast, the Commission expected Microsoft to ensure what it termed "interoperability with the Windows domain architecture", 42 meaning that it should be possible to run rival workgroup server OS on one workgroup server within a larger Windows domain. In that case, business customers can mesh Windows and rival servers within their domain, and accordingly every single server is open to competition. This could be compared with "competition in the market". Of course, the required degree of interoperability is then much higher: not only must rival workgroup server OS interoperate with Windows clients, they must also be interoperable with the Windows servers found within the rest of the Windows domain.
Both the Commission and the CFI simply assume that the latter option -competition in the market -is preferrable. The CFI endorses the Commission view that the higher degree of interoperability bound with this option "was necessary in order to enable 38 Judgment at para. 207-245, followed by the discussion of whether the remedy actually matches the substantive analysis of the Commission at para. 246-266. 39 As economic literature shows, however, the choice between competition for and in the market is not so simple. 44 Among others, it involves trade-offs between various models of innovation. Crisply put, competition for the market might provide stronger incentives for breakthrough innovation, since the whole market is at stake, but it is likely to give the market leader a strong -usually dominant -position. This dominant position is then the prize which competitors want to take away from the market leader in the next period, when further breakthrough innovation reshuffles the market. In contrast, competition in the market places firms are under constant pressure to operate as efficiently as possible and to innovate, even if only incrementally, in order to gain an advantage over competitors within a largely common technological environment. However, the incentives to come up with a massive breakthrough innovation could be reduced, in the absence of the prospect of large innovation rents for the market leader.
In Microsoft, regrettably, neither the Commission nor the CFI went squarely into the basic issue of why competition in the market and incremental innovation should be preferred to competition for the market and breakthrough innovation. At most, there are oblique references when the CFI answers Microsoft's argument that the degree of interoperability required by the Commission was erroneous. 45 The CFI seems to consider that, because of Microsoft's 'superdominance' 46 on client OS, the Windows domain architecture has become the de facto standard for workgroup servers, as confirmed in the evidence gathered by the Commission (in particular market surveys). On that basis, and without further discussion of the competition policy implications, the CFI confirms the Commission conclusion that interoperability within the Windows domain architecture is indispensable.
Once the degree of interoperability required by the Commission is agreed to, the rest of the reasoning concerning indispensability follows. 47
Elimination of competition on the downstream market
The next condition in the IMS test is that the refusal to disclose the information would eliminate competition on the relevant downstream market. The CFI confirms the relevant market definition of the Commission and the methods used for the assessment of market shares. 48 It is interesting to note that the CFI finds that, in any event, the case of the Commission does not rest on the correct assessment of the market for workgroup server OS, since the theory of harm put forward by the Commission involves leveraging of Microsoft's uncontested dominance on the client OS market over to the workgroup server OS market. 49 The Commission case is then subjected to a reality test where the CFI reviews the actual determination that the refusal to supply the interoperability information is likely to eliminate competition on the relevant market. The main difficulty is that, despite Microsoft's increasing market share, a number of competitors have managed to remain active on the market, and Linux providers emerged as new competitors during the term covered by the inquiry. In theory, it is conceivable that such a competitive fringe would suffice to keep the market competitive. However, the CFI agrees with the assessment of the Commission, which was relatively well evidenced.
Hindrance to the emergence of a new product
The tensions caused by the reshuffling undertaken by the CFI to fit the case within the IMS test are most visible when it comes to the condition that the refusal to supply information must prevent the emergence of a new product for which there is demand.
That circumstance was developed at the greatest length in IMS, 50 which was rendered after the Microsoft decision. In IMS, as in Magill 51 where the new product circumstance was introduced, the facts were reasonably clear: Magill was seeking to bring to the market a new type of TV guide, whereas NDC (the applicant in IMS) seemed to want to replicate IMS' product. Here the case can be construed in many ways: the Commission chose to emphasize the disruption of existing supply relationships with the introduction of Windows 2000, 52 so that competitors were prevented from continuing to offer competing products with innovative features, by way of "follow-on innovation". 53 This might suffice under the general Commission approach whereby the list of conditions is not limited to the IMS test: the case would then come closer to the more classical caselaw such as Commercial Solvents (refusal to supply whereby existing dealings are terminated). The CFI, on the other hand, chose to frame Microsoft within the IMS test, with its seemingly more exacting "new product" criterion.
The answer of the CFI is to follow the line of reasoning of the Commission, namely to go back to the text of Article 82(b) EC, which presents "limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers" as a type of abuse of a dominant position. The CFI then links the new product condition to the wording of Article 82(b) EC, holding that the "appearance of a new product cannot be the only parameter... prejudice may arise where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also 48 For a criticism of market definition, see Pardolesi and Renda, supra, note 37 at 543-547. 49 Judgment at para. 559. Leveraging claims being complicated and controversial in economic theory, one would have expected the CFI to spend more time on this point. 50 Supra, note 9. 51 Supra, note 7. 52 Decision at para. 578-584. 53 Ibid. at para. 693-700. of technical development". 54 Leaving aside the limited probative value of the illustrative list of Article 82 EC, 55 the CFI is at pains to reconcile this conclusion with IMS, where Article 82(b) played no role in the reasoning and the ECJ insisted on the need to show that the applicant "intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand". 56 Thereafter, the CFI finds that the Commission committed no manifest error in its Decision. In essence, once they obtain the interoperability information from Microsoft, competitors have an incentive to introduce workgroup server OS which are differentiated from and provide added value over Windows workgroup server OS. 57 Here as well, much as on the indispensability issue, the Commission and the CFI assume that incremental innovation -such as would typically result from a "competition in the market" or cumulative knowledge model -is at least as valuable as the lumpier breakthrough innovation which would occur under a model of "competition for the market" or non-cumulative knowledge. This assumption is not explicitly discussed anywhere in the Decision or the CFI judgment.
Much has been written already and will still be written on how the CFI stretched the new product circumstance in Microsoft. 58 Finally, the CFI leaves the door open for Microsoft to prove that its refusal to disclose the interoperability information is objectively justified. 61 Before the Commission and the CFI, Microsoft's argument rested on the adverse incentives on innovation which would follow from compulsory disclosure of interoperability information. 62 The CFI dismissed the argument as "vague, general and theoretical", 63 repeating its earlier finding that the remedy did not allow cloning of Microsoft products and -interestingly enoughreferring once more to Microsoft's disclosure policy on earlier versions of Windows, which apparently did not affect the innovation incentives. 64 More fundamentally, Microsoft shows the shortcomings of the efficiency defence as envisaged in the 2005 Discussion Paper. 65 First of all, the very "efficiency" which is at stake in Microsoft is not so much an efficiency gain which would result directly from a given course of conduct, 66 but rather a concern for the long-term, dynamic implications of the competitive analysis. 67 As such, it is not so much an 'efficiency defence' as a component of a proper competitive analysis. It cannot easily be dealt with at the tail-end of the inquiry, after the main elements of Article 82 EC -dominance and abuse -have been established, as the Commission proposed in its 2005 Discussion Paper. 68 In Microsoft, the Commission had difficulties holding to this artificial separation between the abuse and the efficiency defence. At the end, it did frame its conclusions in terms of balancing: "on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft's incentives to innovate is outweighed by [the] positive impact [of the disclosure] on the level of innovation of the whole industry". 69 Microsoft seized the opportunity to argue that the Commission was introducing a new test for the application of Article 82 EC, in violation of previous ECJ case-law. 70 The CFI 61 On the availability of the defence and the burden of proof, the CFI follows the position set out DG Competition in its Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 EC to exclusionary abuses (December 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, at para. 77 and ff. On that issue, the Discussion Paper builds on existing case-law. 62 To the extent that, as pictured by the Judgment at para. 689-695, Microsoft would invoke the mere existence of intellectual property rights over the interoperability information as an objective justification in and of itself, the argument would be circular, as the CFI notes. However, Microsoft's argument went further and considered also the ex ante effect of forced disclosure on its incentives to innovate in general. 63 66 Compare for instance with the efficiencies arising from certain types of vertical restraints in terms of avoiding free-riding and overcoming information asymmetries. 67 The whole argument centres on incentives to innovate, so that even at the theoretical level (leaving aside the quantification problem), there might never be any efficiency gain, given that innovation is unpredictable. It is all about trying to influence the course of future events in a matter which is thought favourable. In the Discussion Paper, supra, note 61 at para. 234-236, the Commission classifies this argument as a defence, without really addressing the issue raised here. 68 See Dicussion Paper, supra, note 61 at para. 77 and ff. 69 Decision at para. 783. 70 In principle, this argument appears to run against the interest of Microsoft, given that a balancing test would likely do better justice to its arguments on innovation incentives. However, in the context of the review of an existing Commission decision, any legal argument which would lead to the invalidity of the decision was presumably thought to be worth making.
considered the above passage as a mere slip of the pen by the Commission, 71 yet the CFI is equally at pains to explain how the innovation incentives can be dealt with as a defence, separately from the assessment of the impact of the course of conduct on the market carried out to establish the abuse. Its reasoning on this point is at best contrived.
Operationally, putting the efficiency defence at the tail-end of the analysis places the defendant before a formidable task, as Microsoft shows. Once the Commission is satisfied that the defendant holds a dominant position and that its conduct constituted an abuse, i.e. produced anti-competitive effects to the detriment of consumers, it is difficult to see how a defendant could turn the tide by arguing that in the end the course of conduct does create efficiencies which actually benefit consumers. The CFI unwittingly illustrates this point by stating that the Commission had to "consider whether the justification put forward [...], on the basis of the alleged impact on its incentives to innovate, might prevail over [the] exceptional circumstances [of the IMS test], including the circumstance that the refusal at issue limited technical development to the prejudice of consumers". 72 This Herculean task is not made easier by the uncertainty concerning the burden of proof. 73 Admittedly, the alternative -a balancing test carried out within the assessment of abuse -also carries its own operational difficulties, including a greater risk of error due to the discretion inherent in any balancing. 74
Conclusion on the refusal to disclose interoperability information
In the end, with respect to the refusal to disclose interoperability information, Microsoft must be seen as another step in the long struggle of EC law to find a suitable analytical framework to deal with refusal to supply (and more broadly with cases where longer-term considerations relating to dynamic efficiency and innovation). Part of that struggle involves ending the separate life of the infamous "essential facility doctrine" and basing the analysis on sound principles consistent with the rest of Article 82 EC. In Microsoft, the CFI shies away from the open-ended approach of the Commission, but it perhaps tries too hard to hold on to the orthodox IMS test. After all, the IMS test is but a set of proxies.
In a perfect world with complete information, refusal to supply cases could be dealt with, in line with the rest of Article 82 EC, as follows. 75 Intervention should occur only if it brings about an increase in overall welfare. For that, in a very simple fashion, 0
∆ is the variation in welfare brought about by the intervention in period 1 (now) and 2 (in the future), when compared to the baseline scenario (no intervention). where TV is the total value to consumers of the service, TC the total cost of providing them and a C the cost of decision-making by the authority. 76 TV will increase if for instance the intervention removes a deadweight loss or shifts the demand curve through the apparition of new offerings. TC depends on the costs of the two parties, the incumbent (defendant) and the entrant seeking access:
∆ reflects the increased costs incurred by the incumbent to provide access (including the loss of economies of scale and scope, opportunity costs and the cost of additional facilities) and e C ∆ the reduction in cost for the entrant in not having to duplicate or replicate the input, facility or information to which access is sought.
As for period 2, it is characterized by an expectation of innovation, which changes the value of the service to 2 TV , 77 so that )
That expectation of innovation is therefore equally affected by the intervention of the authority to compel access to facilities or information. 78 For instance, intervention will modify the incentives to innovate on the part of the incumbent 79 or of the entrant 80 or create a climate where market players wait for signals from the authority before engaging into innovative ventures.
In real life, however, most of these values cannot be quantified. In particular, i C ∆ is hard to ascertain ahead of intervention and 2 W ∆ is almost impossible to quantify. 81 The IMS test is designed to provide an approximation of the outcome of the first equation above: -
The indispensability condition aims to ensure that e C ∆ is negative (cost savings) and high, so that in any event TC ∆ will be limited if not negative. Furthermore, if the cost of duplicating or replicating the facility is low, presumably the baseline scenario (without intervention) will involve duplication or replication on the entrant's own motion, so that 0 1 = ∆TV and intervention is not warranted; -If the refusal to supply is likely to eliminate competition on the downstream market because of the market power of the incumbent, then in all 76 This includes the cost of making a decision (i.e. determining whether access should be granted, where or over which information and at what cost) and enforcing it. The cost of continuing to enforce the decision in subsequent periods (litigation, reporting, etc.) is ignored for the sake of simplicity. 77 It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that TC is not changed from period 1, since there is no new intervention. Innovation could of course also consist in decreasing costs rather than increasing valuation. 78 The effect of the intervention of the authority can be felt not only on the relevant market, but also on other markets. 79 By giving rise to an expectation that rents on future innovation will also be confiscated via compulsory access or disclosure orders. 80 By giving a greater incentive to innovate in the knowledge that access to information or facilities in the hands of dominant players will be enforced. At the same time, small entrants must also fear that, if successful, their own innovation rents could be confiscated in turn. 81 . Moreover, the incentives of the entrant to innovate are negatively affected by the refusal to supply, so that 2 W ∆ could be positive.
-
The new product condition also has a double proxy function. First of all, it also tends to indicate that 0 1 > ∆TV , because consumers would value a new product for which there is pent-up demand. Secondly, if the entrant brings out a new product differing from the product of the incumbent, presumably the latter's incentive to innovate is not too adversely affected, 82 so that again 2 W ∆ would tend to be positive.
-
If the efficiency defence is considered separately as an objective justification and not as part of the elimination of competition condition, and if the arguments relating to incentives to innovate are part of it, then it does provide an indication regarding 2 W ∆ .
The above shows that the proxies included in the IMS test are neither especially precisethey all serve a dual function -nor exhaustive. In particular, they are weak as regards the approximation of 2 W ∆ .
If other proxies can be found, there is no reason not to use them if they improve the quality of the approximation. 83 Seen against that background, the open-ended approach of the Commission is quite sensible. Two other additional conditions, in particular, were invoked by the Commission in its Decision; as shown above, they also surfaced in various places in the CFI reasoning: -The refusal to disclose interoperability information could be construed as a disruption of previous levels of disclosure in earlier versions of Windows. 84 This would imply that i C ∆ cannot be excessive, given the previous disclosure practices. Furthermore, if Microsoft still managed to be innovative despite voluntary disclosures to competitors on the workgroup OS market, then the effect of disclosure on its innovation incentives cannot be so high, 85 meaning that 2 W ∆ would remain positive.
-Microsoft holds a "superdominant" position on the neighbouring market for client OS, 86 although it is not superdominant on the workgroup server OS market. If the assumptions implicitly underlying the case stand (competition for the market, cumulative knowledge and incremental innovation), then superdominance will not vanish overnight, and therefore Microsoft would still retain significant incentives, despite compulsory disclosure of interoperability information to competitors. 82 Since the entrant expands the market and increases the innovation rent, albeit not at the same rate as if the incumbent itself would have supplied the new product. At the same time, the entrant can also undermine the incumbent's incentives by engaging in vertical differentiation with a new product of a lower quality. 83 See also P. Larouche, "The role of the market in economic regulation" (Inaugural lecture), Tilburg, 2003 for a discussion of how C a can serve as a proxy for C i and W 2 under certain circumstances. 84 Decision at para. 578-584. 85 As noted in the Judgment at para. 702. 86 For a critical view on the relevance of super-dominance, see J. Appeldoorn, "He who spareth his rod, hateth his son? Microsoft, superdominance and Article 82 EC" (2005) 26 ECLR 653.
Here as well, the impact of disclosure on the innovation incentives would therefore be limited, meaning that 2 W ∆ would remain positive.
The following table sums up the above discussion: Proxy for: TV 1 C i C e W 2 Indispensability X X Elimination of competition X X New product X X Efficiency defence X Previous course of conduct X X Superdominance X
In sum, as long as the conditions invoked in the reasoning of the competition authority do contribute to approximating the decision which would be taken under perfect information, there is no reason to exclude them. What is more, since the reasoning of the Commission and the CFI implicitly rests on a coherent but untested model of innovation and given that assessing the impact of intervention on innovation is very difficult, the CFI should have recognized the usefulness of taking into account every relevant proxy in the legal test in order to get the best possible picture.
Tying
Whereas in the first part of the case, the CFI reshuffled the legal reasoning of the Commission, in the second part concerning tying, the CFI followed the line of reasoning of the Commission, after having supplied it with a legal underpinning. 87 Every condition of the tying test is reviewed in turn. 88 3.1.
Separate products
On the first condition, namely that the tying product (Windows OS) and the tied product (WMP) are separate products, all agree that customer demand is determinative of the issue, but Microsoft and the Commission disagreed on the assessment of customer demand. For the Commission, the mere existence of some customer demand for separate products is sufficient to satisfy this condition. For Microsoft, customer demand for separate products must be significant. 89 Quite possibly, both the Commission and Microsoft could be right about consumer demand. Amongst end-users, two classes of consumers can probably be distinguished. Firstly, more tech-savvy consumers want the best available media player for their requirements, and are able and willing to undertake whatever operations might be necessary (including downloading a programme, installing it and configuring Windows) to obtain and use that media player. These consumers prefer choice over convenience. Secondly, mainstream consumers have neither the skills nor the will to play with the software on their computer; they expect their computer system to be able to handle media files and will be satisfied with whichever media player or "media functionality" handles that task. They prefer convenience over choice. Without making an empirical claim, it is probably fair to venture that the former class of consumers represents a non-negligible minority. If that intuition is correct, then there is demand for the products separately from each other and the CFI rightly sided with the Commission.
3.2.
Impossibility to obtain the tying product without the tied product
The CFI also confirmed the conclusion of the Commission that consumers are unable to obtain the tying product without the tied product. As the CFI explains, 91 this can be construed as a reformulation of the condition found in Article 82(d) EC to the effect that consumers are compelled to accept 'supplementary obligations'. Even though WMP is given away for free, 92 the CFI agrees with the Commission that OEMs -and their consumers -are compelled to take it when they install Windows on their products and cannot uninstall it. However, the CFI fails to properly factor in the impact of the Consent Decree in the US Microsoft case. 93 Among other obligations, Microsoft undertook in the Consent Decree to add to Windows what is now the "Set Program Access and Defaults" feature, 94 allowing end-users to choose directly which media player they want to use and effectively to short-circuit the tie between Windows OS and WMP. The CFI considered that the Consent Decree was not adequate, since customers remain compelled to acquire both products together. 95 For OEMs, indeed, it means that any competing media player would be installed in addition to and not instead of WMP, giving rise to additional costs uselessness of the remedy ordered in Microsoft. Leaving the remedy aside, however, the issue is whether there is separate demand for each product (i.e. without tying), which could take the form of demand for a package where Windows and WMP are sold together but can be untied as required. As the CFI rightly remarks at para. 921, Microsoft's argument could imply that complementary products cannot be separate products. 90 for configuration and for sales support. 96 From an end-user perspective, however, it is a matter of which default rule is chosen: the solution following from the Consent Decree amounts to tying by default with the possibility to break the tie, whereas the Commission in its assessment requires the reverse option, namely no tying by default with the possibility to integrate WMP into Windows if desired.
3.3.
Foreclosure of competition
If the Consent Decree is not construed as giving consumers the choice to avoid the tie between Windows OS and WMP, then at least it should have been reflected in the core of the analysis, namely the foreclosure of competition. The CFI here follows the Commission analysis, which focuses on the OEM channel. In essence, tying WMP to Windows OS gives WMP an "unparalleled presence": OEMs have no incentive to present other bundles to their end-users, and the latter cease to use other distribution channels when they see WMP installed ab initio. 97
While attractive in surface, the theory of harm put forward by the Commission and endorsed by the CFI suffers from one major weakness: it was not borne by reality. Since the Commission stated its case in 2001, 98 seven years have gone by and the harm has not materialized. As the Commission noted, Microsoft was able to build market share on the media player market, up to the point where it held close to 50% of the market. 99 However, its market share has been stagnating in the last years, as iTunes established itself and Adobe Flash made inroads due to the popularity of YouTube. Real also managed to retain second place behind WMP. To the informed observer, the media player market seems very competitive still.
It is not clear why the fears of the Commission did not materialize. On the one hand, the Commission might have made the wrong assumptions about the significance of the OEM channel, the behaviour of users or the innovativeness of the market. On the other hand, the Consent Decree might have removed the threat of harm by strengthening end-user choice and control. The remedy imposed by the Commission in Microsoft, however, had little effect: Windows XP N has been a commercial failure. Certainly, if the theory of harm of the Commission turned out to have been correct, the Commission remedy alone could not have prevented harm from occurring in the absence of the Consent Decree.
Assuming that the intuitive two-class end-user model set out above is accurate, the techsavvy users will try to avoid the tie and will look for the best media player(s) available. 100 For these users, media players compete on performance. Conversely, the mainstream users will stick with WMP for the sake of convenience, but they are certainly not impervious to performance. less choice. Should WMP be a significantly worse product than its competitors, however, the cost savings in not having to bother with shopping around for a media player would be defeated by the loss of utility in using a sub-standard product. Presumably, mainstream users could then be convinced to take the steps to move to a competing media player. Mainstream users can be kept informed on quality by freeriding on the experience of tech-savvy users, which is relayed to them via media outlets. As long as the tech-savvy user segment is competitive, therefore, Microsoft is under pressure to keep WMP close to the best-of-breed, in order to avoid that the mainstream users would desert it. Mainstream users receive a product of reasonably good quality while not having to incur selection costs. The mainstream user segment could therefore work efficiently, even if it were dominated by one producer. This model has worked on the browser market, after the Consent Decree, where Microsoft Internet Explorer is kept in check by Firefox, Opera, Safari and others. Under this line of analysis, integration delivers its benefits to the mainstream users who value it, while the tech-savvy users obtain the best product that they are seeking. The main role for competition authorities is to keep the tech-savvy segment open, which the US authorities did with the Consent Decree by ensuring that the tying can be defeated or reversed. The remedy advocated by the Commission in Microsoft, in contrast, is of limited use, if any.
In strict legal terms, the CFI was not bound to take into account how the market evolved after the Commission Decision. It is conducting judicial review, in order to control whether the Commission Decision was legal when it was taken, and not whether it turned out to have been correct in retrospect. 101 At the same time, given the high stakes in Microsoft and the skill of the CFI, it is surprising that the CFI would not somehow allow its reasoning to be influenced by how reality did unfold, at least as far as the interplay between the EC and US remedies was concerned.
On a positive note, the CFI supports the decision of the Commission to treat the foreclosure of competition as a separate condition which must be investigated on its own. 102 Microsoft opportunistically argued that this marked a departure from previous case-law, where the very tying was deemed to have a foreclosure effect by nature. 103 The CFI rejects that argument, although unfortunately it stops just shy of ruling that foreclosure of competition must always be established separately. 104
3.4.
Absence of objective justification
Finally, much like on the interoperability issue, the discussion of the efficiency defence brought forward by Microsoft as an objective justification for the tying illustrates the weakness of the Commission approach to efficiencies under Article 82 EC. Putting efficiencies at the tail-end of the examination makes the defence practically pointless. Indeed the CFI promptly sides with the Commission in rejecting Microsoft's arguments, mostly because the Commission remedy does not forbid the bundled Windows and therefore does not take away the efficiencies arising from the integration of WMP into Windows.
Conclusion on tying
In the end, even though the substantive analysis of the Commission on tying is generally sound, one is left wondering why the Commission chose to pursue the tying case further after the US Consent Decree entered into force in 2002. On a proper assessment of the competitive situation, the Consent Decree addressed the concerns which arose from tying, by ensuring that end-users could still break the tie and switch to other products. If the Consent Decree was not an adequate remedy because it was limited in duration, the Commission could have adopted it and made it permanent. 105 Instead, the Commission chose to narrow its focus to the OEM channel and insisted on the creation of a Windows version without WMP (Windows XP N). That product was doomed from the start, being placed on the market alongside the bundled version and sold for the same price.
Indeed, in light of the preceding discussion, the tying case cannot be just about Windows OS and WMP and competition on the market for media players. To a large extent, the Consent Decree addressed these issues. The Commission case is also about who gets to makes fundamental decisions such as the bundling decision. 106 The Commission is concerned generally with the control of innovation paths and intended Microsoft to break new ground in this respect. 107 When dealing with foreclosure of competition, the Commission analyzed how Microsoft could use the position of WMP on the media player market to create network effects in favour of its proprietary encoding formats. 108 This could then eventually spill over to other markets (distribution of content over other devices than computers, digital rights management (DRM) systems, etc.). 109 The CFI 105 As discussed in P. Larouche, "Legal issues concerning remedies in network industries", in D. Geradin, ed., Remedies in network industries: EC competition law vs. sector-specific regulation (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004) 21 at 39-41, however, experience shows that competition and regulatory authorities, once they have invested in an investigation, will not readily conclude that the actions of another authority have already addressed the issues which arise from the investigation. 106 The IT industry has always been very critical of Microsoft's single-handed decisions as to which features or applications would be integrated into Windows, since these decisions often terminated or shrunk entire lines of business. Of course, this can be an efficient outcome but the issue remains whether Microsoft is best qualified to make that decision. 107 That concern is also present in the first part of the case dealing with interoperability information, but in a more subdued fashion: see Judgment at para. 392. 108 The reasoning of the Commission assumes that the dissemination of content will take place along the lines of a broadcasting model, where a small number of large content providers and software developers decide for the larger group of passive users. In such a situation, it might indeed pay off to stick to proprietary standards for encoding. However, so far content dissemination on the Internet is also largely done via non-broadcasting models, in particular via decentralized peer-to-peer. In such a case, a proprietary approach to encoding might be unsuccessful, given the large number of smaller content providers. 109 Decision at para. 879-897. endorsed that analysis, but it considered that it was not essential for the case. 110 When Microsoft argued that these network effects actually made the tying of Windows OS and WMP efficient by providing content providers and software developers with an ubiquitous integrated platform, the Commission answered that: "an undistorted competition process constitutes a value in itself as it generates efficiencies and creates a climate conducive to innovation (innovation being, in markets such as the software market, a key competition parameter)". 111 The CFI went even further, holding that: 112 Although, generally, standardisation may effectively present certain advantages, it cannot be allowed to be imposed unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant position by means of tying... [I]t cannot be ruled out that third parties will not want the de facto standardisation advocated by Microsoft but will prefer it if different platforms continue to compete, on the ground that that will stimulate innovation between the various platforms. As with other issues discussed earlier, neither the Commission nor the CFI takes its reasoning to the end. If unilateral standardization by a dominant player is not acceptable, then what is the preferred option? The CFI states that competition between platforms might also be desirable for some, without more. Microsoft calls for further research on the link between competition policy, innovation policy and standardization.
Conclusion and outlook
In Microsoft, the CFI tells us the story of a large, successful and innovative firm by all accounts, that could not however resist the temptation to exploit the opportunities created along the innovation path to take extra jabs at the competition. At the same time, the second part of Microsoft contains another narrative as well, that of the Commission as policy entrepreneur that could not resist the temptation to intervene either, even as its concerns had been by and large addressed. The CFI failed to pick up that second story.
On interoperability, the case is presented by the CFI as a mere application of the IMS test. Whether other conditions exist besides those of the IMS test will have to be settled on another day. The CFI gives undue significance and autonomy to the IMS test, which ultimately is but a set of proxies. 113 As a matter of law, it ignores other equally useful proxies which the Commission had put forward in its Decision, namely the previous course of dealings and the superdominant position of Microsoft.
On tying, the test used by the Commission is found to be in line with the existing caselaw (Hilti and Tetra Pak II), but here as well, the CFI avoids to rule on the thornier issue of whether foreclosure must be proven separately as an autonomous condition of the tying test. That will also have to wait for another case. Perhaps the biggest disappointment in the whole case is that the CFI does not seem willing or able to rein in the Commission when, after a reasonably sound case in substance, it ignored the effect of the Consent Decree and went on to order an outlandish remedy, the creation of Windows XP N.
Not only is the CFI judgment in Microsoft long and difficult to digest in its entirety, but it is structured in such a way that the "official" legal discussion is limited in scope and relatively uncontroversial. Accordingly, its precedential value could remain limited. This would turn Microsoft into a very complex but ultimately unique case, contrary to what the Commission intended at the time it took its decision. 114 In that sense, while the Commission won its case in front of the CFI, it did not obtain the resounding endorsement it was hoping for. The CFI did not settle the law, and the issues raised in Microsoft will end up before the CFI again.
Indeed whether Microsoft will have a larger impact -as Ahlborn and Evans fear 115 depends on the extent to which, in subsequent cases, various key points hidden in the discussion of the reasoning of the Commission are extricated from their context and turned into general legal propositions. In the part on interoperability information, for one, the Commission and the CFI implicitly prefer competition in the market and incremental innovation over competition for the market and breakthrough innovation, as reflected in the discussion of the indispensability and new product circumstances. Unfortunately, this choice remains implicit; perhaps it is linked with the super-dominance of Microsoft, as some passages would seem to indicate, in which case the issue will remain open in subsequent cases where the defendant is not super-dominant. In the part on tying, both the Commission and the CFI briefly glimpse into the links between competition policy, innovation and standardization, raising more questions than they answer. Here as well, the discussion takes place against the background of super-dominance, so that it might be confined to the facts of Microsoft.
So far, the main impact of Microsoft is psychological. After a string of defeats, 116 122 On the international scene, Microsoft has been criticized as yet another instance of excessive interventionism by the European Commission, but at the same time in certain quarters the Commission has also been applauded as the only major competition authority which actually dares to tackle difficult cases and large defendants. 123 Happily or not, Microsoft could herald a passing of the torch to the European Commission as the leading competition policy enforcer, at least in the high-tech sector.
At the policy level, Microsoft lays out bare the shortcomings of the approach proposed by the Commission in the Discussion Paper 124 for the inclusion of an efficiency defence in Article 82 EC analysis. In both parts of the case, the split between the assessment of abuse (in particular of the anti-competitive effect of the allegedly abusive conduct) and the efficiency defence is hard to follow at a conceptual level, and in practice it makes the efficiency defence a hopeless exercise, coming as it does at the tail-end of the analysis.
Ahlborn and Evans consider that Microsoft follows an outdated ordoliberal approach. 125 Such sweeping criticism is exaggerated. Contrary to what Ahlborn and Evans claim, Microsoft marks a significant improvement in the quality of the competition analysis, away from the hallmarks of ordoliberalism -a form-based approach, the special responsibility of the dominant firm 126 -and towards a more effects-based approach. In both parts of the case, the Commission carefully set out how the conduct of Microsoft in its view harmed competition and ultimately consumers; as set out above, the CFI could have endorsed this evolution more strongly.
restrictions imposed on iTunes users (via credit card controls) preventing them from purchasing in iTunes stores outside the Member State where their credit card was issued, leading to differentials in price and choice between Member States. Contrary to the other cases mentioned here, this case is based on Article 81 EC, relying as it does on the distribution agreements between Apple and major record companies. It was settled when Apple agreed to equalize iTunes prices: "Commission welcomes Apple's announcement to equalise prices for music downloads from iTunes in Europe", IP/08/22 (9 January 2008). Apple has also been involved in competition litigation at Member State level, concerning the restrictions on playing iTunes tracks on other MP3 players than the iPod (France and the Netherlands, complaint rejected) or the exclusive distribution agreements for the iPhone (Germany, interim measures against Apple refused on appeal). 120 "Commission initiates formal proceedings against Qualcomm", MEMO/07/389 (1 October 2007). Qualcomm allegedly breached Article 82 EC when licensing its intellectual property on exploitative terms. 121 "Commission initiates formal investigations against Microsoft in two cases of suspected abuse of dominant market position", MEMO/08/19 (14 January 2008). These revisit the two issues in Microsoft, albeit on new markets, namely the release of interoperability information regarding Microsoft Office and the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows so as to defeat open standards. These two new cases have allegedly caused Microsoft to espouse a different approach and issue its Interoperability Principles on 21 February 2008: http://www.microsoft.com/interop/principles/default.mspx. 122 All the more since the CFI did quash the Commission Decision as far as the use of the monitoring trustee was concerned (Judgment at para. 1261 and ff.),, implying that more Commission resources will need to be dedicated to the implementation of decisions than was the case in Microsoft. 123 The latter is not entirely accurate, since the US Department of Justice did succeed at least in part in its case against Microsoft: United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001) (en banc ). 124 Supra, note 61. 125 Ahlborn and Evans at {17-20}. 126 The notion of special responsibility is only mentioned once in the reasoning of the CFI (at para. 229), in a quite inconsequential manner.
The evidence of ordoliberalism brought forward by Ahlborn and Evans is not convincing. For one, while the CFI lapses into "competition on the merits" language at times, by and large the improvements in interoperability in Windows 2000 and the efficiencies arising from bundling Windows OS and WMP are recognized as legitimate achievements from which Microsoft is not to be deprived. It is the additional steps of refusing to disclose interoperability information or not enabling customers to separate Windows OS from WMP which give rise to problems.
If anything, what Ahlborn and Evans criticize as the use of form-based analysis and structural presumptions, allegedly leading to a shift in emphasis on static competition, could be more constructively interpreted as a divergence of views on dynamic effeciencies and innovation. Ahlborn and Evans take a somewhat offhand view: as long as firms -including larger ones -are incentivized, innovation will ensue and bring about measurable static benefits in the form of efficiencies (better interoperability, integration of media functionality, etc.). Dynamic aspects, since they cannot be measured, are better left alone. The Commission and the CFI take a different and equally coherent view, but unfortunately they leave it unarticulated. As indicated above, Microsoft rests on an implicit preference for incremental over breakthrough innovation -at least when superdominance is involved -and a concern for the control over innovation paths. The Commission intervenes to protect the competitive process not for the sake of keeping competitors in business, but rather in order to ensure that innovation continues to be generated outside of the superdominant firm (or at least that incentives remain for competitors to try to innovate). By the same token, consumer preferences -the decisive factor in rewarding innovation --are expressed directly through the competitive process as opposed to the unilateral decision of a firm based on its perception of these preferences.
It is by no means clear that the view of the Commission and the CFI is preferrable; it has its advantages and disadvantages, which need to be further researched and which will hopefully be better understood and explained in future cases. However, that view cannot be summarily branded with the 'stigma' of ordoliberalism.
